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PUTTING SOME TEETH IN TILA: FROM
DISCLOSURE TO SUBSTANTIVE
REGULATION IN THE
MORTGAGE REFORM AND ANTIPREDATORY LENDING ACT OF 2010
Dee Pridgen *
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free market do its magic. This has long been the philosophy of
federal credit regulation, from the passage of the Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA") in 1968 until recent times. Disclosure regulation is a
perennial favorite of legislators and regulators, as well as industry,
because it is less costly and less interfering than price controls, such
as the old usury laws, or other types of substantive regulation. Almost
from its inception, however, it was recognized that there were
problems with the disclosure approach, such as too much clutter, too
many technical violations and too much information for consumers to
use. For many years the response to these issues was to try to
improve the disclosures, first by simplification, and also by
improving the timing in which they are given. And yet studies
showed that consumers did not, or could not, use the mandated
disclosures to make good choices. Behavioral economists
demonstrated that there are very daunting cognitive and behavioral
obstacles that prevent many consumers from using the information
provided. The recent subprime mortgage crisis brought to the
forefront the fact that the TILA disclosures were powerless to prevent
or dissuade consumers from obligating themselves to potentially
disastrous mortgage transactions. One powerful response to these
developments is found in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
M. Williams Professor of Law & Social Responsibility, University of
Wyoming, College of Law.
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Lending Act of 2010, one title of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act. This law, which includes many
revisions to TILA in the area of home-secured credit transactions,
takes a much more substantive regulatory approach than has been
seen until recently in federal credit regulation.
This article will first provide a brief overview of the history of
the disclosure approach taken by TILA, from its inception through
various reform measures that attempted to improve the disclosures
required under the law. Next, the scholarship elucidating the practical
limitations of disclosure as consumer protection, especially in
residential subprime mortgage transactions, will be summarized. The
specific substantive provisions to protect consumers of residential
mortgage loans under the new legislation will be surveyed,
accompanied by a discussion of why disclosure alone was inadequate
in each of these targeted areas. Finally, the costs and benefits of
substantive regulations as opposed to disclosure alone will be
discussed. The article concludes that the failure of the pure disclosure
approach has necessitated more substantive restrictions on consumer
credit in the residential mortgage market. However, these substantive
provisions work best when focused on specific abuses, and should
not be considered as a total replacement for disclosures, but rather as
a complement to disclosure for particular issues that cannot be
remedied by disclosure alone.
I. HISTORY OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION UNDER TILA
The mother of all federal consumer credit laws, the Truth in
Lending Act, was conceived as a disclosure law when it was debated
and passed by Congress in the late 1960s.1 Disclosure was considered
the perfect form of consumer protection because it supported the free
market by providing consumers with informed choices without
banning any particular credit offering. 2 It was also the least costly and
most politically acceptable method of regulation. Prior to the
passage of TILA in 1968, consumers were confused and misled by
'Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321,
82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.) [hereinafter TILA]; see
generally DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE
LAW, Ch. 4, §§ 4:1 to 4:3 (West 2011-2012 ed.) for historical background on TILA.
2 Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer
Credit: The HistoricalContext of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807,
880-885 (2003).
3 Griffith L. Garwood, Robert J. Hobbs & Fred H. Miller, Consumer
Disclosure in the 1990's, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 777, 780-781 (1993).
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creditors who were using conflicting methods for measuring the cost
of credit, including discount rates, add-on rates and standard interest
rates applied to a declining balance.4 There was also variation in what
creditors revealed about the total finance charge.5 Creditors were not
required to disclose anything about the cost of credit prior to a
transaction, regardless of the measurement method used.6
Consequently, comparative shopping was difficult or impossible
under these conditions.
The Truth in Lending Act, which is one title of the umbrella
Consumer Credit Protection Act, took a pure disclosure approach.
Such an approach was in contrast to the preceding approach under
state law, which mainly sought to cap the price of consumer credit
through usury statutes. The problem with state usury laws was that
the definition of the interest rate that was capped was full of
loopholes and was easily evaded.7 Economists vigorously criticized
such price control laws as skewing the true market price of the
product, i.e., consumer credit, because price controls, by definition
do not allow competition in the marketplace to set the price.
However, as the TILA drafters realized, competition in the consumer
credit sector could not, and would not, work well if the consumers
were unable to ascertain comparable prices for competing credit
offerings. Therefore, TILA's approach of having a uniform cost of
credit, particularly the federally defined Annual Percentage Rate, or
APR and the finance charge, disclosed prior to consummation of a
credit transaction, was viewed as a way to remedy the market failure
posed by non-uniform pricing.9 Also, the TILA credit cost disclosure
approach was deemed to promote better consumer choices and more
vigorous competition in the marketplace.
It is a basic assumption of the competitive model that all
market participants, buyers and sellers, possess "perfect information"
that aids in seeking out the best market offerings to meet needs. If
consumers, such as credit consumers prior to the enactment of TILA,
do not possess and cannot obtain such information about competing

4

National Commission on Consumer Finance, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE

UNITED STATES 169-70 (1972).
5 Id.
6 id.

James J. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REv. 445 (2000).

8id.

9 Edward Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth in
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991).
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offerings, the market breaks down.10 Thus, simply providing
consumers with the information they need to make rational choices
protects both consumers and the free market and is an approach that
gains supporters from both classical economists and consumer
Fully-informed, rational consumers, under a pure
advocates.
disclosure regime, simply select the best choice of credit offerings
based on perfect information, while creditors are forced to compete
with each other to gain the favor of such fully-informed buyers. 12
In the ensuing years after the passage of TILA, it became
clear that the TILA disclosures were too complex and too poorly
presented to achieve their goals of promoting a competitive consumer
credit market. The disclosures did not have much impact because
consumers could not understand them and did not have the
opportunity to use them for comparison shopping. 3 Disclosures were
given shortly before the signing of the credit contract, a time when
the consumer is already psychologically committed to the deal, and is
probably not inclined to comparison shop. 14 TILA also required
disclosure of numerous items in addition to the APR and finance
charge that cluttered the process in ways that made the critical
information difficult for consumers to find.'5 Creditors also
complained about the complexity of the disclosures as well as the
flood of litigation alleging various technical violations.16 This
sparked a movement to simplify the disclosures, which came to
fruition in the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of
1980.1'
One of the main purposes of this first major overhaul of TILA
was to provide consumers with simpler, more understandable
information. Disclosures were reduced and a new formatting
10 Pauline M. Ippolito & David T. Scheffman, eds., Federal Trade
Commission, Bureau of Economics, EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER
PROTECTION EcoNOMics, 4-7 (1986).
' Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807,
880-885 (2003).
12 id
13 Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending,
1977 U. Ill. L. Forum 669,
672-74.
14 Landers & Rohner, A FunctionalAnalysis of Truth in Lending,
26 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 711, 723-27 (1979).
15 Id.
16 Federal Reserve Board, Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation Z, 46
Fed. Reg. 20848-20849 (April 7, 1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
" Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A.).
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requirement, "the Federal Box," was inaugurated. The Federal Box
basically required all TILA disclosures to be segregated from the
contract terms, with the APR and finance charge disclosures
receiving the most prominence." The Federal Reserve Board also
created model forms to provide guidance to creditors on how to
comply with the law.' 9 These reforms were supposed to eliminate the
problems of information overload and the obscuration of key terms
that consumers needed for comparison shopping.2 0
Until recently, despite its shortcomings, disclosure remained a
preferred approach to problems in consumer credit, with various
attempts being made over the years to continue to improve the
timing, formatting and wording so as to make the disclosures more
useful to consumers. In the mortgage area specifically, TILA and
Regulation Z have long provided that consumers be given early
estimated disclosures of credit costs, within three days of receipt of
the consumer's application by the lender.2 1 Recognizing the
importance of providing early disclosures of credit costs, when
consumers are still in a position to comparison shop, Congress passed
the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988. The Act
requires early disclosures in a readable, tabular format in most
solicitations for credit or charge cards,22 before the consumer has
even filled out an application. But standard closed-end consumer
credit loan disclosures, such as an automobile loan, continue to be
provided late in the process, typically in conjunction with
consummation of the transaction. The consumer may not see the
TILA disclosures until seconds before they sign the credit
agreement. 24
Despite early disclosures for residential mortgage loans, the
1 S. Rep. 96-73 at 3 (Apr. 24, 1979), 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 281-282; see also
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supranote 1, § 6:30.
'9 Federal Reserve Board, Truth in Lending: Proposed Official Staff
Commentary, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,560 (May 27, 1981).
20 S. Rep. 96-73 at 3 (Apr. 24, 1979), 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 281-282. But see
Ralph J. Rohner, Truth in Lending "Simplified": Simplified?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
999 (1981).
21 The early disclosure requirement for residential mortgage transactions
covered by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act has been a part of TILA
since the 1980 Simplification Act. This requirement is now applicable to all
mortgage loans secured by a consumer's dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a)(1)(i)
(2009).
22 Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960
(1988).
23 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b).
24 See, e.g., Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848 ( 7 th Cir.
2002).
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problem of complexity and information overload has continually
plagued this area of consumer credit. Since the 1970s and 80s,
residential mortgage loans have been offered with variable or
adjustable rates, which necessitated more complex disclosures due to
the increased complexity of the transactions. Special adjustable rate
mortgage ("ARM") disclosures, including a general consumer
information booklet, have been a part of the TILA disclosure regime
since the 1980s. In 2009, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a new
round of amendments to the ARM disclosures that would streamline
the application disclosure and require transaction-specific disclosure
25
within three days of when the lender receives an application. One
inherent problem with ARM disclosures, however, has always been
that there is no one APR or finance charge that a consumer could use
for comparison shopping with this type of mortgage. Similarly, Home
Equity Lines of Credit, or HELOCs, a type of open-end credit
secured by the existing equity in a consumer's home, also called for
special TILA disclosures due to the characteristics of these loans.2 6
Thus Congress amended TILA in 1988 to require improved
disclosures for HELOCs.2 7 As with ARM disclosures, revisions of
the HELOC disclosures were proposed in 2009, but have not yet gone
into effect.2 8 Due to the complex and inherently variable and
unpredictable nature of these transactions, however, the disclosure
approach, no matter how consumer-friendly it becomes, may not
achieve the ideal TILA model of informed consumers spurring a
competitive consumer credit market. 2 9
Thus, over the decades after the passage of TILA, the credit
products being offered, especially in residential mortgages or
dwelling-secured transactions, were becoming more and more
complex and the disclosure regime was struggling to keep up with the
information needed to make rational choices in this environment.
Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43232 (Aug. 26, 2009). These proposed
regulations are on hold due to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau which now has jurisdiction over consumer credit regulation.
26 Federal Reserve Board, Truth in Lending: Home Equity Disclosure and
Substantive Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,670 (June 9, 1989). See also Eckman &
Semmelman, A Look at Home Equity Loans: Some Problems and Solutions, 41
Bus. LAW. 1079 (1986).
27 Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-709, 102
Stat. 4725 (codified at 15 U.S.CA. § 1647).
28 Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 43428 (Aug. 26,
2009).
29 See infra text accompanying footnotes 54-56, discussing the cognitive
limitations most consumers expenence in processing complicated mortgage loan
disclosures.
25
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Nonetheless, the predominant regulatory response was to tinker with
the complicated disclosures to attempt to make them more accessible
and understandable to the consumers who were expected to use them.
By the 1990s and 2000s, however, a new wave of scholarship
focusing on behavioral economics pointed out the limits of consumer
disclosures for the type of complex credit transactions that were
being offered. It was argued that even a rational consumer faces
almost insurmountable cognitive obstacles in seeking to understand
TWA disclosures and to use them in making rational choices,
30
especially in the context of subprime real estate transactions.
II. THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION IN THE
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET
The pure disclosure approach to consumer protection may
have reached its peak utility. Mandated disclosure has become so
pervasive over the past fifty years, that the flood of information may
well be drowning consumers. Disclosures have ranged well beyond
the consumer credit area, and into areas of informed consent for
health care decisions, product warnings, and consumer contract
boilerplate clauses - which are now presented in scroll down boxes
that pop up on computer screens with the ubiquitous requirement that
the consumer click "I agree" before proceeding with their purchase.
The sheer accumulation of consumer disclosures may have the
unintended and unhelpful effect of becoming almost universally
ignored by their intended beneficiaries. 31
The disinclination or inability to use the mandated
information has become particularly acute in the area of homesecured consumer credit. A Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
study published in 2007 found that the required mortgage cost
disclosures did not accomplish the goal of conveying pertinent
mortgage costs to consumers.32 The FTC study surveyed consumers
who had recently taken home-secured mortgages, and even in a quiet,
unhurried laboratory setting, about one-third of the respondents could
not identify which of two loans was less expensive, half could not
See infra text accompanying footnotes 31-45.
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647 (2011).
30

31

32 JAMES

M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURES, AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE

DISCLOSURE

FORMS,

ES

6-7

(June

2007),

available

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf.

at
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correctly identify the loan amount, two-thirds did not recognize that
they would be charged a prepayment penalty if they refinanced with
another lender within two years, and almost four-fifths did not know
why the interest rate and the APR of a loan sometimes differ.33
Another more recent survey by Professor Jeff Sovern demonstrated
that mortgage brokers reported that borrowers never withdrew from a
loan after reading the final TILA disclosures, never used the
disclosures for comparison shopping for loans, and that most
borrowers spent very little time with the disclosures, despite the
amount of money at stake and the length and complexity of the
disclosures. 34
As the subprime mortgage crisis unfolded, it became clear
that certain types of "exotic" or "toxic" real-estate loans were being
offered to subprime borrowers, who were likely to accept the terms
without being fully aware of the actual costs and pitfalls involved,
despite the presence of TILA disclosures. First, while ARMs have
been around for a while, there was recently a higher prevalence of
hybrid ARMs, which pose more traps for the unwary consumer.
These hybrid ARMs featured a relatively low fixed rate for an
introductory period, followed by an adjustable rate period with a
large spike in the monthly payment. 35 Another type of product that
defied consumer comprehension of risks were the so-called
"payment-option ARMs," which allowed the borrower to choose
varying payment levels, the lowest of which did not contribute
anything to the principal and thus resulted in negative amortization. 36
Balloon payments coupled with prepayment penalties also hurt
consumers who perhaps had counted on refinancing in an everupward climbing real estate market, only to find themselves locked
into loans with unfavorable terms when the real estate market
collapsed. The dangers of these types of financing arrangements were
particularly difficult for consumers to absorb, even with the benefit of
TILA disclosures. 37
Consumers who are seeking to borrow relatively large sums
Id.
Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer
ProtectionLaw or How the Truth In Lending Act Failedthe Subprime Borrowers,
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 (2010).
3 Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-FrankPrevent
Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1252-1254 (2011).
33

34

36

id.

Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: the
Problem ofPredatoryLending: Price,65 MD. L. REV. 707, 768 (2006).
3
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of money to purchase a home may be subject to certain psychological
pressures that make it difficult to absorb the relevant information
presented to them via government-mandated disclosures. As the
credit-products have become more complicated, so by necessity have
the disclosures. And with more information being presented,
consumers are more likely to experience information overload. In this
situation, many people will seek to reduce the number of variables
they consider to those that are most salient, such as the amount of the
monthly payment in the near term, and ignore the amount of the
monthly payment and other variables that arise only in the long
term. 38 The stress of the mortgage loan decision may also lead
consumers to mistakenly make quick decisions to escape the stressful
situation, rather than spend extra time and effort to understand the
39
parameters of the transaction being presented. Also, the further
along in the process the consumer is before they see the required
disclosures, the less likely they are to abandon even a very risky and
expensive home loan, due to the "endowment effect," whereby
consumers tend to overvalue something that they already consider
theirs, such as their new home. 40 Thus, even with early TILA
disclosures, consumers may not be willing to provide adequate
weight to the full TILA disclosures that they are given shortly before
closing.
Subprime borrowers, in particular, may come into the lending
market feeling relatively insecure and "ego-threatened" because their
ability to secure an affordable loan may be viewed as quite uncertain.
Race and gender may also play a role in the borrower's feelings of
stress and insecurity, which may divert their attention away from
trying to determine whether the terms being offered are favorable to
them.4 ' People who feel they are in a position of weakness relative to
the seller are less likely to focus on the facts of the transaction. Such
consumers may also be overly trusting and rely on the mortgage
broker to make a determination for them. Many people rely too
heavily on what a perceived expert such as a lender or broker may
say, even when a mandatory disclosure contradicts what the
perceived expert is saying. And they may also wish to have an expert
actually make the decision for them, rather than use the available
information to make their own decision, because many people are
38 Id.

" Id. at 769.
40 Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Consumer Protection Initiatives
in the EU Mortgage Market: A Behavioral Economics Based Critique and
Proposal,25 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 17 (2011).
41 Id. at 772-776.
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simply averse to making decisions.42 Unfortunately, under the
previously prevailing form of mortgage broker compensation, such as
yield spread premiums, such brokers had a built-in conflict of interest
and an incentive to steer their clients toward transactions that were
more expensive and less favorable to them in the long run. Indeed,
the mere fact that a willing lender was presented to the vulnerable
consumers may have led them to ignore the unappetizing costs and
terms in the disclosures.4 3
Also, in loans that have large payment increases built in,
consumers tend to underestimate or ignore such future costs while
placing more emphasis on short-term costs such as a low down
payment or relatively low monthly payments for the first period of
the loan.44 Payment increases may come in the form of a switch from
an introductory fixed rate to a (usually) higher adjustable rate, or in
the form of a balloon payment. Borrowers are said to be myopic
about long-term costs, focusing solely on the lower short-term
payments. In addition, borrowers may assume that if their payments
go up after the introductory rate ends or because of a scheduled
balloon payment, that they will be able to readily refinance the
mortgage and avoid these increased costs. However, the increasingly
common presence of prepayment penalties in subprime mortgage
loans meant that quite often the borrower would be trapped in the
higher cost loan. Again, consumers who are focused on the present
have difficulty factoring in information about the costs and
consequences of events like prepayment penalties that may or may
not come about. In addition, many consumers are overly optimistic
about the future, and may wrongly assume that their income will go
up just like they assume real estate prices will go up. Many
consumers do not and cannot envision themselves incurring
prepayment penalties or defaulting, so they do not consider these
costs when taking out a loan initially, even if they are clearly
disclosed. They only realize the significance of such terms much
later, usually when it is too late to avoid them.
Another aspect of the increasing complexity of consumer
credit disclosures is the number and variety of fees imposed by
creditors, and the fact that such fees may not be included in the
disclosed APR and finance charge. Exceptions from the finance
charge definition for broker compensation, credit insurance, credit
Shahar & Schneider, supra note 31, at 725-729.
Stark & Choplin, supra note 40, at 17-18.
44Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts,94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1119 (2009).
45 Id. at 1120.
42
43
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reports, appraisals, etc. have undermined the usefulness of the single
APR credit price tag.

Some scholars have advocated for a reform of

the definition of APR and finance charge to be more inclusive so that
these disclosures could fulfill their original role of providing a clear
and uniform price tag for the cost of credit.4 7 A 2007 Federal Trade
Commission mortgage disclosure study had also advocated improved
disclosures as the way to increase consumer use of credit
disclosures.4 8 While this would certainly be an improvement over the
present situation, merely enhancing the value of the APR disclosure
and the understandability of other credit disclosures is not sufficient
to protect consumers in the current mortgage market.
The improvement of consumer credit disclosures is also part
of the mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB"), the brainchild of Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard professor
and consumer advocate. 4 9 Professor Warren pointed out that credit
products, such as subprime mortgages, can be unsafe for consumers
who do not understand what they are getting into,o and yet such
products were not regulated as effectively as other types of consumer
products, such as toasters or lawnmowers. Consumer credit was
regulated by a variety of bank regulators whose mission was to
protect the safety and soundness of the financial institutions they
oversaw and not the consumer.5 1 By creating the CFPB, whose
primary mission would be to protect consumers with regard to
financial matters, consumers could be better protected by a noncaptive government agency and the repeat of the subprime mortgage
crisis could perhaps be prevented. This new consumer protection
agency will promulgate regulations implementing the substantive
requirements for residential mortgage loans, as discussed herein.
However, the agency has also announced new efforts to simplify
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and
Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON
REG. 181, 230-234 (2008).
47 Id.; see also Bar-Gill, supra note 44, at 1073.
48 LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 32 at ES-Il to ES-12.
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Enrolled Act H.R. 111-4173, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5512).
5o Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (2008).
st The Federal Trade Commission historically also played a role in the
enforcement of consumer credit regulation, but the Federal Reserve Board had been
charged with the main responsibility for writing the regulations in this area. See
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 1, § 15:2.
46
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mortgage disclosures to improve their readability and usefulness.52
The CFPB will combine the now separate early mortgage disclosures
under TILA and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA"3 into one more readable and easy to understand
disclosure. Thus many regulators have attempted and continue to
attempt to improve consumer credit disclosures.
Others have advocated for increased financial literacy to help
consumers overcome the cognitive and emotional barriers they may
be facing when confronted with financial credit cost disclosures. For
instance, in 2003 Congress established the Financial Literacy and
Education Commission to "improve the financial literacy and
education of persons in the United States through development of a
national strategy to promote financial literacy and education." 54
Typically, the consumer credit industry has favored this approach.
The argument is that well-educated and informed consumers can
rationally overcome the cognitive barriers to using financial
information, and could protect themselves in a competitive credit
market without the need to curb any particular credit products or
practices. The financial literacy approach harkens back to the original
concept of TILA to simply arm consumers with comparative cost
information, ideally in a form they can understand, and then
government can sit back and let the free market do its work.
However, the evidence that such education works to improve
consumer decisions in the financial sector has been questioned by
scholars, most notably Professor Lauren Willis. 56 As noted above, the
sheer volume and complexity of the information needed to
understand and wisely choose among today's consumer credit options
is well above the average consumer's cognitive abilities, and no
amount of education, short of one-on-one counseling for each and
every transaction, would be adequate to protect consumers in many
See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, JULY 21-DEC. 31, 2011 (Jan. 30,
52

at
available
2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01 /CongressionalReportJan2012.pdf.
5 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. Law 111-203, Sections 1032(f), 1098, 1100A (2010)
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532(f)). These regulations are to be promulgated by
July 21, 2012.
5 20 U.S.C. § 9702 (July 21, 2010), now supplemented by the CFPB's Office
of Financial Education, with the Director of CFPB serving as Vice Chairman of the
Financial Literacy Commission, Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. Law 111-203, § 1013(d)
(2010).
5 See generally Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-LiteracyEducation, 94
IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008).
56 Id.
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situations they face today. It is as unrealistic to think that average
consumers can educate themselves to the extent necessary to make
sound credit decisions using mandated disclosures alone, especially
in the mortgage m'arket, as it is to assume that consumers can all be
their own lawyers, doctors or automobile mechanics. Sometimes
disclosure is simply not enough to protect consumers from
exploitation. Sometimes substantive regulation of products and
contract terms offered in the marketplace is the only effective
solution.

III. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
LOANS IN THE MORTGAGE REFORM AND ANTIPREDATORY LENDING ACT OF 2010
Perhaps in response to the criticism of the disclosure
approach, Congress passed some sweeping substantive requirements
with regard to residential mortgage loans in the Mortgage Reform
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010 (hereinafter "Mortgage
Reform Act"), which is one title of the comprehensive Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 57 With these new
requirements in place, consumer protection in the residential
mortgage area will turn away from almost exclusive reliance on
consumer disclosure and consumer self-protection, and will look to
substantive reform as the preferred method of protection. The
impressive array of new substantive reforms contained in this new
law are coming down the pike soon 58 and mark a major shift in the
approach to consumer credit regulation. The main areas of
substantive reform include:
* Universal requirement of consumer "ability to repay" as a
condition for all residential mortgages;5 9
* Creation of a "safe harbor" for creditors who offer "qualified
mortgages" that have certain characteristics that are favorable to

57 Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see generally PRIDGEN &
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 1, §9a; see also Susan Block-Lieb &
Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681 (2011) for an overview of the Act and its legislative
history.
58 The effective date of most of the provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act is
determined by the date when implementing regulations go into effect or by January
21, 2013 if no regulations are issued by that date. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(b)(2).
5 15 U.S.C. §1639c(a)(1).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

628

[Vol. 24:4

consumers; 60
Ban on mortgage brokers steering consumers into unfavorable
loans and accepting yield spread premiums as compensation;61
Strict limits on prepayment penalties;6 2
Ban on "single premium" credit insurance;6 3
The prohibition on pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
most dwelling-secured consumer loans; 64 and
The imposition of "appraisal independence requirements" in all
consumer credit transactions secured by the principal dwelling of
the consumer.65

.*

*
*
*
*

In addition, the Mortgage Reform Act enhances the impact of
pre-existing substantive and disclosure regulations regarding certain
high-cost mortgage loans under the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act ("HOEPA") of 1994 because it broadens the scope of
HOEPA to cover many more subprime residential loans.66 Each of
these aspects of the increasing use of substantive regulation in the
residential mortgage market under TILA will be discussed below.
The Mortgage Reform Act includes a requirement that all
creditors who offer residential mortgage loans must verify that the
borrower has a reasonable ability to repay. 67 This major reform is
included in the Mortgage Reform Act because of the perverse
incentives that had existed during the build-up to the subprime
mortgage crisis. When banks or other lenders dealt directly with
borrowers, and kept their loans in-house, they had a built-in incentive
to verify that the person asking to borrow money would be able to
repay. However, with the rise of mortgage brokers working on
commission and lenders reselling mortgages to distant investors,
consumers were often encouraged to take out loans based more on
the value of the collateral than on their income. 68 Brokers could
15 U.S.C. §1639c(b).
61 15 U.S.C. §1639b(c)(1). This prohibition on YSP was foreshadowed by a
60

Federal Reserve Board regulation that contained a very similar provision. 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.36(d) (2011).
62
6

6
61

66
67

15
15
15
15
15

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§1639c(c).
§1639c(d).
§1639c(e)(1).
§1639e.
§ 1602(bb).
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a).

68 Linda Singer, Zachary Best & Nina Simon, Breaking Down Financial
Reform: A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM.
L. 2 (2010).
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collect their fees and lenders could make their profits by passing on
risky loans to others, while consumers made the gamble that they
would indeed be able to make their monthly payments.69 As
discussed above, for loans that had built-in payment hikes, adjustable
rates, negative amortization, or balloon payments, the disclosures did
not sufficiently deter consumers from taking on more risk than was
realistic given their income and resources because of their inherent
tendency to focus on the near-term payments and downplay the long
term costs and risks.7 0 To address this failure of the disclosure
regime, the Mortgage Reform Act puts the responsibility on the
creditor to refrain from making loans that the consumer is not likely
to be able to repay.
The Mortgage Reform Act also contains a provision that
attempts to encourage the use of mortgage loan contracts that include
more favorable provisions for consumers without actually rewriting
all contracts by law.7 2 The previously mentioned requirement that
lenders verify that borrowers have a reasonable ability to repay the
loan could potentially be a burden on lenders considering the
increased documentation that may be entailed. As an alternative to
complying with that section, however, the Mortgage Reform Act
holds out a safe haven for lenders who are willing to offer a so-called
''qualified mortgage" that must have certain pro-consumer
characteristics. 73 These loans must have the following provisions to
avail themselves of qualified mortgage status:
*
*
*
*
*
*

No negative amortization;
No interest only loans;
No balloon payments;
Consumer's income and financial resources are documented;
Rates are fully amortizing;
Creditor complies with regulations and guidelines about debtto-income ratios;
Total points and fees are not more than 3% of the total loan
amount;
The term of the loan is not greater than 30 years. 7 4

*
*

69id

70

See Bar-Gill, supra note 44, at 1119.

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a).
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b). This section provides a rebuttable presumption that
the creditor has met the "ability to repay" requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1).
7
72

73
74

d.

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2).
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Whether creditors will start issuing residential mortgage loans
that contain this array of pro-consumer provisions remains to be seen.
In any event, this will be a fascinating experiment to see whether an
industry can be "nudged" to produce more consumer-friendly
contracts if not required to do so.7
For several years prior to the passage of the Mortgage Reform
Act, there had been a regulatory struggle between the Federal
Reserve Board, the agency that issued regulations under TILA prior
to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency that
implements RESPA regarding a ban on both steering and the use of
yield spread premiums as broker compensation. 76 A yield spread
premium ("YSP") is a form of mortgage broker compensation
whereby the broker is paid by the lender for the loan yield amount
that is higher than what would have been brought in by the lowest
rate the lender would have been willing to accept for that particular
transaction.7 7 This type of compensation incentivized brokers to
convince borrowers to take out higher cost loans in order to increase
78
their own level of compensation. A disclosure of the YSP was
contained in a RESPA-related disclosure form called the Good Faith
Estimate. 79 But the RESPA disclosure was somewhat oblique in that
it did not highlight that consumers were paying their broker
compensation in the form of higher rates on their loan.8 0 The YSP
compensation was also disclosed as part of the APR and finance
charge of a residential mortgage loan because this type of broker
compensation became part of the financing cost of the loan.8 1
Thus, under prior law, consumers were told the actual cost of
their loan, but not in a way that allowed them to understand that their
loan cost them more because they were compensating their mortgage
broker in the form of a higher interest rate. 8 2 The disclosure approach
7 Cf RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNsTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008).

12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2616.
n Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1007-1008 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1171 (2003).
78 Elliott Klayman, Yield Spread Premiums, Illegal Referrals,
and the Real
Estate Settlement ProceduresAct: Blurred Vision, 32 REAL EST. L. J. 222 (2003).
79 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7 (2011).
80 Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The
Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. POL'Y REv. 289, 305308 (2007).
" 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d) & (e).
82 See supra text accompanying notes
77-79.
76
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to YSP compensation also did not showcase the fact that consumers
may have qualified for a less expensive loan if they were willing to
pay their broker fees upfront rather than through financing.8 3 The
Federal Reserve Board, meanwhile, had proposed an amendment to
TILA's Regulation Z that would have prohibited YSP compensation,
rather than attempt any further improvements on the disclosure.8 4 The
substantive approach of simply eliminating this unfair and, for many
consumers, unintelligible form of broker compensation will be
85
implemented under the Mortgage Reform Act.
Related to the ban on YSP compensation is the ban on
steering consumers toward unfavorable mortgage loans. Prior to the
subprime mortgage and foreclosure crisis, brokers were accused of
steering consumers away from loans with more favorable rates, due
to their incentive to earn higher YSP compensation, and steering
them toward mortgages that consumers lacked the ability to repay, or
loans that had predatory characteristics such as equity stripping,
excessive fees, and abusive terms, and mortgages that were based on
inaccurate documentation regarding the consumer's credit record and
the appraisal value of the property to be purchased. The provision in
the Mortgage Reform Act will help stop the practice of steering
consumers toward more expensive, subprime loans when they would
actually qualify for more favorable conventional loans by banning
such behavior, rather than trying to cure such practices through
improved disclosures.
Consumers also had difficulty understanding and avoiding
See Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation:
The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 289, 308-311
(2007); Peter J. Hong & Marcos Reza, Hidden Costs to Homeowners: The
Prevalent Non-Disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in Mortgage Loan
Transactions, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 131, 148-150 (2005).
84 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (2011). This was to have gone into effect in April
2011, but was superseded by the Mortgage Reform Act.
8 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1). Note that even under the new law, a mortgage
originator will be able to receive a fee from a creditor if the mortgage originator did
not receive any direct compensation from the consumer, and the consumer did not
pay any upfront points or fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(2)(B). Also, consumers will
still be able to finance origination fees or costs so long as these fees do not vary
based on the terms of the loan (other than the principal amount). 15 U.S.C.
1639b(c)(4)(C).
86 15 U.S.C. 1639b(c)(3). The CFPB is mandated to promulgate regulations to
implement this ban on steering.
87 See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255,
1281-1286 (2002).
83
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prepayment penalties based on disclosure alone.88 Prepayment
penalties are monetary amounts charged to the borrower for repaying
the loan in the first few years, typically through refinancing. The
penalties are meant to help lenders recoup the revenues they would
lose in the long term should the loan be paid off early, while locking
borrowers into high-cost loans that will be profitable to the lender
over the long term. 90 This penalty is particularly difficult to address
through advance disclosure alone because it is a deferred cost that
may not arise, and if it does, its impact is something that will take
effect in future years. Behavioral economists have stated that
consumers often underestimate future costs, and so the overall cost of
a particular loan may appear cheaper to a consumer than it really is. 9 1
In the Mortgage Reform Act, prepayment penalties will be prohibited
for residential mortgage loans that are not qualified mortgages, 92
adjustable rate mortgages, and mortgages that have an APR that
exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction by
2.5 percentage points for first lien loans or by 3.5 percent for
subordinate liens. 93 Even for those mortgages that come under the
"qualified mortgage" safe haven, prepayment penalties must be
limited to no more than 3 percent of the outstanding loan balance
during the first year, no more than 2 percent of the loan balance
during the second year, and no more than 1 percent of the loan
balance during the third year; no prepayment penalty is allowed at all
after the third year. 94 Additionally, when creditors offer a consumer a
loan with a prepayment penalty, they must also offer the consumer an
alternative loan that does not have a prepayment penalty. 9 5
The Mortgage Reform Act also imposes a ban on financing of
"single premium" credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment,
credit property insurance, accident, loss-of-income, life insurance,
health insurance, and debt cancellation, or suspension agreements for
all loans secured by a dwelling, both open and closed end. 96 Credit
life and other forms of credit insurance have long been criticized by
consumer advocates as benefitting creditors (who are literally the
beneficiaries of such insurance policies) more than they benefit
88Bar-Gill, supra note 44, at 1120.
' Id. at 101-02.

90 Singer, Zachary & Simon, supra note 68, at 2.
91Bar-Gill,supra note 44, at 1119-1121.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(1).
94 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(3).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(4).
96 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(d).
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consumers. 9 7 Nonetheless, under TILA, such insurance did not have
to be included as part of the finance charge as long as it was disclosed
as voluntary, the premium for the initial term was disclosed, and the
consumer signed or initialed an affirmative written request for the
insurance after receiving the specified disclosures. 98 A particularly
egregious practice was the financing of "single premium" credit
insurance, which has the effect of imposing large upfront premiums
on consumers that become part of their overall debt, but from which
they do not benefit if they pay off the loan early. 99 With "single
premium" insurance, the consumer pays for the insurance for the
whole term of the loan at the outset, and the premium is then included
in the amount financed. The Mortgage Reform Act bans this practice,
although insurance premiums calculated and paid on a monthly basis
are still permitted. o Again, a ban is necessary because disclosure
alone would not have effectively helped consumers make a rational
choice regarding this particularly obscure type of financing due to
consumers' cognitive barriers to processing long-term costs.
Another bright spot for consumers in the Mortgage Reform
Act is its ban on pre-dispute arbitration clauses in all dwellingsecured closed-end consumer loans, and all open-end consumer loans
secured by the consumer's principal dwelling. 102 Such arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts deprive the consumer of the right to go
to court to protect their rights even under specific consumer
protection statutes (such as TILA) that grant a private cause of action
and a possible award of attorney's fees. 0 Many scholars and
consumer advocates have argued against the enforcement of such
clauses on the basis that consumers do not get fair treatment in
arbitration forums where the judges are paid by repeat players like
the creditors.1 04 Arbitration requires the parties to pay the cost of the
proceedings, their own attorney fees, and other litigation costs; they
97 See, e.g., Consumers Union & Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Credit Insurance: The
$2 Billion A Year Rip-Off(1999), availableat http://www.cej-online.org/credit.php.
98 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(1) (2010).
99 Singer, Zachary & Simon, supra note 68, at 2.
1oo 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(d)(1).
'1 Bar-Gill, supra note 44, at 1119-1121.
112

15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1).

103See

generally Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92

(2000). See generally PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 1,

§ 15:15 Arbitration of TILA Claims.
'0 See generally e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237,
1253-58 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1650-51 (2005).
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also give up the right to a jury trial, an appeal, and possibly class
actions.105 Given that the United States Supreme Court has had a long
history of favoring the enforcement of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts by virtue of a strict adherence to the Federal
Arbitration Act, 106 countervailing legislation by Congress appears to
be the only way to relieve consumers of this type of clause.
Disclosure of the fact that disputes will be subject to arbitration has
proven unhelpful because these clauses appear in standard form
contracts that are seldom read and never negotiated, and the
possibility of having a dispute go to arbitration rather than to court is
a fact that is a long range possibility, not something that consumers
typically focus on in making a mortgage loan decision.' 07 Thus, once
again, the Mortgage Reform Act substantively prohibits this type of
clause in dwelling-secured loans, rather than relying on disclosure
alone. 0 8
Finally, the Mortgage Reform Act imposes "appraisal
independence requirements" in all consumer credit transactions
secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer. 109 In the period
before the subprime mortgage crisis, it was alleged that mortgage
brokers sometimes coerced appraisers to artificially inflate the value
of the home being purchased on credit, which led to consumers
taking on more debt than necessary, and paying too much for their
homes."10 Such inflated appraisals also had the effect of enhancing
the broker's commission if based on the sale price of the home."
TILA, as amended by the Mortgage Reform Act, now imposes
"appraisal independence requirements" in all consumer credit
transactions secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer.
Violations of these requirements include:
*

Coercion of an appraiser to attempt to cause that person to base

generally Alderman, supra note 104, at 1237.
'0 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744
(2011), applying the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2, to a cellular telephone contract that
contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a waiver of class arbitration.
107 See Bar-Gill,supra note 44, at 1119-1121.
1os The CFPB has been charged with studying mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses for all consumer credit contracts, not just mortgages, and would
have the authority to issue a regulation banning or limiting such clauses. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5518. There is no set deadline for this action, however.
109 15 U.S.C. §1639e.
110 See generally J. Kevin Murray, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks
in the Foundation of the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1301
(2010).
105See

"1 Id.
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the value assigned to the property on any factor other than the
appraiser's independent judgment;
Mischaracterization of value, including misrepresentation,
falsification or alteration;
Withholding or threatening to withhold timely payment in order
to influence an appraisal;
Appraiser may not have a direct or indirect interest in the
property being appraised."'

*
*
*

Creditors who are aware of such violations may not extend
credit without documentation of reasonable diligence regarding the
property valuation.1 13 Violations of these requirements may result in
civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each day the violation continues,
in addition to the normal TWA civil liability.' 14
Mortgage servicers are also subject to other requirements
under the Mortgage Reform Act, including many disclosure
provisions but also some substantive ones such as restrictions on
escrow accounts and "force-place" insurance.1 15 Thus, the Mortgage
Reform Act has taken a rather aggressive approach to these types of
issues in mortgage servicing. 116
IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF PUTTING MORE "TEETH" INTO
CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION
The substantive provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act
outlined above are part of a trend in consumer credit regulation. For
instance, the 2009 Credit CARD Act, a law that overhauled TILA's
provisions regarding unsecured open-end credit plans (i.e., credit
cards),11 7 contained many substantive provisions as well as improved
disclosures. These substantive provisions include limits on the timing

U.S.C. §1639e; 12 C.F.R. § 226.42.
15 U.S.C. §1639e(f).
115
U.S.C. §1639e(k).
1
15 U.S.C. § 1639d (escrow accounts); 12 U.S.C. § 2605(1).
116 See generally Robert A. Cook & Meghan Musselman,
Summary of the
Mortgage Lending Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
ConsumerProtectionAct, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 231 (2010).
117 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734. For an overall description and discussion of this
law, see Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform
and the Uneasy Casefor Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924 (2010).
112 15
3
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of increases in interest rates,s a ban on "two-cycle" billing,1 19 limits
on the availability of credit cards to youthful consumers under the
age of twenty-one,120 and limits on certain types of fees and billing
practices. 12 1 As with mortgage reform, lawmakers were cognizant of
the limited ability of disclosure regulation to protect consumers, and
thus provided more substantive protection.
The question raised by this trend toward more substantive
regulation is whether the benefits of this regulatory shift outweigh the
costs. Some of the arguments raised by critics of federal substantive
consumer credit regulations include: fears that such a trend will
shrink the availability of consumer credit; that the costs imposed on
the credit industry will increase the cost of credit for consumers; that
there will be unforeseen and unintended adverse effects; and that
such substantive regulation unduly interferes with individual choice
and free market forces.' 22 Federal regulation in the consumer credit
area, even disclosure regulation alone, has long been criticized for
imposing too heavy a burden on industry.123 While it is true that all
regulation imposes costs, it is also true that all unchecked market
exploitation of consumers imposes costs as well.124 It remains to be
seen how the costs of the new substantive regulations of the
Mortgage Reform Act will affect the cost of consumer home-secured
credit, but in the long history of federal consumer credit regulation,
regulation has not produced a shrunken credit market.
Even the most well-intended substantive regulations can have
inadvertent side-effects. For instance, the ban on credit card issuance
to consumers under the age of twenty one in the absence of a cosigner who is at least twenty-one1 25 may have had the unintended
effect of encouraging fellow students who are just at or near twenty
one, and are themselves unaware of the dangers of co-signing any
type of credit transaction, 126 to co-sign for credit cards, as opposed to
15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1.

15 U.S.C. § 16370); 12 C.F.R. § 226.53(b).
U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8).
121 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i).
120 15

122 See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary: The Perils of Public Finance, 64
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 253, 255 (2010).

See generally Stephanie E. Dreyer & Petre G. Weinstock, Less Is More:
Changing the Regulator's Role to Prevent Excess in Consumer Disclosure, 123
BANKING L.J. 99 (2006).
124 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The
Law and Economics ofPredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1297 (2002).
125 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8).
126 Erica Sandberg, 3 Reasons Not to Co-sign for College
Students' Credit
Cards, CREDITCARDS.COM (July 30, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit123
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the intended co-signers: parents and guardians.127 A cap on fees for
one type of transaction, such as the cap on debit card processing fees
that can be charged by banks to retailers contained in the Dodd-Frank
Act,128 may simply result in the increase of other fees as banks seek
to make up their lost revenues in other ways.129 At this point, when
most of the substantive provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act have
not yet been implemented, it is impossible to predict what unintended
side-effects may develop, but past experience shows that it is difficult
to write any law that does not entail such effects.
Another criticism of the substantive approach is that
outlawing specific practices, or requiring others, necessarily is a
reactive process, in which the substantive requirements are in
reaction to perceived past abuses of consumers. 13 The regulation of
specific practices in turn may spawn industry reaction, and the result
will be the creation of new practices that are outside the boundaries
of specific regulations, but that may have similar bad effects. In other
words, specific substantive regulation always risks the discovery and
exploitation of overlooked loopholes or unforeseen developments
that skirt the intent of the law. For instance, when Congress passed a
restriction on "wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale
records" to protect consumers' privacy regarding the titles they
rented from a "video tape service provider,"' 3 1 they may not have
foreseen the development of DVDs and online streaming. Thus, it
may well be that the new substantive regulations in the Mortgage
Reform Act, such as those mentioned above, will soon be outmoded
as market participants find other ways to structure their transactions
so as to maximize profits while not necessarily providing consumers
with the full level of protection intended by the law.
The marketplace and technology have a way of outpacing
THE
card-news/sandberg-3-reasons-not-cosign-fellow-college-students-1377.php;
CREDITEER, College Students, Credit Cards and the Co-Signer (May 2, 2010),
http://thecrediteer.com/2011 /05/college-students-credit-cards-and-the-co-signer/.
127 Note that the Federal Trade Commission has a regulation requiring
disclosure to co-signers for the very reason that many consumers do not understand
their obligations when they co-sign a loan. 16 C.F.R. § 444.3.
128 15 U.S.C. § 16930-2(a), mandating regulations to set reasonable fees for
interchange transaction fees for debit card transactions.
129 See Bank Accounts: More Fees Are Coming. How to Fight Back -- or Flee,
CONSUMER

REPORTS,

Feb.

2012,

http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/02/bank-accounts/index.htm.
130 Max Huffman, Presentation at the Loyola Consumer Law Review
Symposium on The Continuing Effects of the Mortgage Crisis on Consumers (Feb.

24, 2012).
'"'

18 U.S.C. § 2710.
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regulations of all types, both disclosure and substantive. Even within
the disclosure regime, the TILA disclosures have had to grow in
length and complexity to keep up with new credit products that
include multiple APRs and fees. 2 And yet, even with the move
toward more substantive federal credit regulation, disclosure will
continue to play an important role in protecting consumers. The
CFPB is working on the daunting task of developing an integrated,
shortened, and more accessible disclosure form for home mortgages
that will combine the requirements of both TILA and RESPA.1 33
Recognizing that the work of improving the comprehension of
consumer disclosures is never really done, the CFPB conducted seven
rounds of consumer testing and has processed 27,000 comments on
the proposed combined home mortgage cost disclosure.' 34 Improving
disclosures is a necessary complement to the substantive regulations
on mortgages mentioned above. While disclosures alone may not be
able to spur consumers to rational decision-making, they are still
necessary and should be made as useable as possible.
While there appears to be a move toward substantive
regulation of consumer credit, as embodied in the Mortgage Reform
Act of 2010, the trend has taken the form of measured, targeted
regulation based on documented abuses. Thus, the Mortgage Reform
Act consists of a specific set of reforms that hopefully will help
consumers avoid exploitation but still leaves room for freedom of
choice by well-informed consumers. No one is advocating a return to
the old usury law approach to consumer credit, which is the ultimate
form of substantive consumer credit regulation. Usury laws for
residential mortgages were abandoned in the 1980s under heavy
criticism of undue interference and distortion of consumer credit
market prices.135 But specific targeted measures, such as requiring
that consumers have an ability to repay their loans; requiring that
132 See supra text accompanying footnotes 25-29, regarding the need for new
disclosure regulations with the appearance of ARMs and HELOCs in the mortgage
market.
13 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1032(f, 1098, 1100A (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532). These
regulations are to be promulgated by July 21, 2012.
134 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Semi-annual Report of the Consumer
at
available
(2011),
14
Bureau,
Protection
Financial
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/semi-annual-report-of-the-consumerfinancial-protection-bureau/.
13 In 1980, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in various
sections of titles 12 and 15 of the U.S. Code), which largely did away with state
usury laws covering loans for residential real property secured by first mortgages.
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appraisers act independently from brokers; eliminating confusing and
potentially unfair forms of mortgage broker compensation such as
yield spread premiums; limiting unexpected traps such as prepayment
penalties; and banning pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, will
likely provide much needed fairness in the home mortgage market.
V. CONCLUSION
The "teeth" in the new TILA provisions represented by the
Mortgage Reform Act of 2010 are a very necessary departure from an
over-reliance on disclosures that are not being used, and toward a
more balanced approach to consumer protection. While this may
seem to move federal credit law away from its founding philosophy
of providing consumers with uniform credit cost information so that
they can make rational decisions in the marketplace, the over 40-year
quest to perfect the disclosure regime has perhaps reached its limits.
Disclosures alone were struggling to keep up with the array of credit
products being offered to consumers, despite mahy worthwhile
attempts to improve the disclosures to make them more user-friendly.
In addition, the teachings of behavioral economics have now
demonstrated that consumers labor under certain cognitive and social
barriers that may prevent them from making the best use of the
information offered. Recent Congressional legislation, such as the
Credit CARD Act and the Mortgage Reform Act, demonstrate how
some targeted substantive provisions can be used to supplement the
use of disclosures. This new willingness of lawmakers to respond to
the needs of consumers is a step in the right direction.

